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Abstract  
Cooperatives are characterised by mutual-benefit coordination mechanisms aimed at the 
fulfilment of members’ welfare. The paper considers cooperative principles and suggests 
a layered framework that relates principles, governance choices, and related aims or 
values. The framework supports the interpretation of cooperative governance and can be 
extended to the interpretation of inter-firm relationships. To this end, we consider an 
extended notion of governance, whereby those who impact on strategic decision-making 
are not to be searched only within the internal governance bodies, typically the board of 
directors, the managers or the assembly, but also outside the cooperative, in the 
extended network of production relationships in which the organisation is embedded. We 
then analyse the features of production linkages and their potentials in the 
accomplishment of cooperative principles. We support our analysis with examples from 
European experiences. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There are 4.7 million people employed by cooperatives in Europe (Roelants et al., 2012). 
Cooperation is a prominent phenomenon in France, Italy, Spain and it is growing up in 
the UK where medium to small cooperatives represent an important part of the 
cooperative economy. The cooperative basic idea is centred on the specific aim of 
membership welfare to be reached by means of democratic governance. Albeit much has 
been written on the dispositions, practices and outcomes affecting economic 
sustainability, member welfare and - through this - community welfare, conversations on 
the impact of cooperative strategies on other stakeholders (besides members) need to 
be developed further (Sacchetti, 2012). Specifically, in this paper we would like to take a 
stand on production coordination and its impacts across networked firms, albeit these 
identify only part of the welfare effects interested by a cooperative’s strategy.  
Over the past two decades the growth and internationalisation of cooperatives has posed 
a number of questions, which have triggered reflection on the consistency of growth 
strategies with cooperative principles. By addressing the specific aspect of production 
coordination across firms, we apply an extended notion of governance, whereby control 
over the allocation of resources is not to be searched only within internal governance 
bodies (typically the board of directors, the managers, or the assembly) and internal 
organisational practices, but also outside the cooperative, in the extended mesh of 
production relationships in which the firm is embedded (Sacchetti and Sugden, 2003).1 
The question we set up to answer addresses the potential impacts of cooperatives on the 
industrial development of localities through other linked firms, their stakeholders and the 
communities where these are situated. To illustrate, consider recent debate about 
worker cooperatives in times of crisis. The European Confederation of Worker 
Cooperatives, Social Cooperatives and Social and Participative Enterprises (Cecop) 
highlights subcontracting as an alternative or complementary solution (amongst others) 
to the use of cooperative reserves in times of crisis (Cecop, 2012). A perspective on 
inter-firm governance would suggest a more careful approach, as the stability of 
employment in worker cooperatives needs to be weighed against the implications of its 
external strategies, controlling in particular for the distribution of the negative 
externalities on for-profit subcontractors and subsidiaries.2  The idea is to reach beyond 
the internal organisation of production and its principles to understand how strategic 
choices about inter-firm coordination can impact on the welfare of connected actors, 
beside members. This problem assumes particular relevance in the context of 
cooperative principles, which explicitly recognise community welfare aims.  
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In 1995, the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) emphasised concern for 
communities as a foundational element of the identity of cooperatives. Literature has 
addressed the relation between democratic governance and community welfare at 
different levels. Empirical findings suggest that by looking after the welfare of members, 
cooperatives support also the wellbeing in their communities. For example, community 
social and economic impacts have been argued to spread through membership, as 
members are as a norm part of the community where production activities are located 
(Borzaga and Tortia, 2009). Consistently with this interpretation, welfare and wellbeing 
(measured in terms of health and safety) have been shown to be higher where 
cooperation and, in particular, worker cooperatives are diffused (Erdal, 2011). 
Cooperatives contribute to the welfare of communities also because they take a long-
term perspective on membership and on the use of resources. Their governance and 
working rules, in fact, require a stable membership. To this end, in times of economic 
expansion, cooperatives create reserves that have been shown to work as buffers when 
the economy contracts (Birchall, 2009; CECOP, 2012; Navarra, 2010). Empirically 
cooperatives have strived for the realisation of the community-care principle also by 
promoting a culture of self-help and mutual responsibility across communities, by 
supporting the creation of new cooperative ventures or, more generally, of social and 
economic activities which are explicitly aimed at the development of horizontal social 
initiatives, such as urban regeneration, cultural and educational activities or other 
welfare services. 
Since inter-firm linkages typically span across communities, it would seem appropriate to 
elaborate an extended interpretation of the ICA community principle. We would therefore 
think in terms of care for multiple communities through the democratic management of 
production linkages. This enlarged focus becomes particularly relevant when the location 
of members (those empowered to make strategic decisions) does not coincide with the 
location of operational activities. Such activities may be undertaken by subsidiaries of 
various natures or by other legally independent cooperatives.  
Here we introduce some elements of novelty. In the literature, conventional approaches 
have mostly focused on membership, that is on the “private” or internal dimension of 
cooperative governance, whilst disregarding the “public” domain, or the external impacts 
associated with every private choice (Dewey, 1927; Branston et al. 2006; Sacchetti, 
2012). To address this point we consider the extent to which strategic choices made by 
cooperatives take into account the welfare of others beyond the rights defined by 
membership.iv Specifically, we enquire on whether the choice of external coordination 
mechanisms, aimed primarily at the achievement of member welfare, compromises or 
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benefits the welfare of other connected actors, therefore impacting on the welfare of 
communities. 
In order to focus on external governance and its impacts we will assume that, internally, 
the cooperative is equipped with deliberation processes that ensure a shared 
understanding of cooperative values and aimsiii and that internal governance and 
practices reflect the essential economic objective of promoting the welfare of members. 
Albeit this is a simplification of an evolving complex reality, it allows us to concentrate on 
the coherence of external governance. As a reflection, the principles help us to 
discriminate amongst inter-firm relationships and possible welfare outcomes. From 
considerations on the nature of inter-firm relations, we will also derive some implications 
for member welfare.  
 
2. The economic nature of cooperatives  
Economic analysis has focused mainly on internal welfare effects, to be reached through 
democratic mutualistic principles. In these respects, cooperative firms are understood as 
mutual benefit organisations created by self-organised principals that operate through 
the “one member one vote” governance rule (Borzaga and Tortia, 2010; ICA, 1995). 
Their nature is given by the need to device mutual-benefit coordination mechanisms for 
the fulfilment of social rights and needs pertaining non-investor stakeholders. Such 
needs would include, for example, the stability of employment and a fair wage for 
workers in worker cooperatives, access to financial support and advice for small 
producers and savers in credit cooperatives, adequate quality and product prices for 
customers in consumer cooperatives, re-investments of surplus in community projects 
for community cooperatives. 
Cooperatives fundamentally differ from conventional firms. Economic analysis in 
particular has shown behavioural diversities not only in individual needs and aims but 
also in the choice of means, emphasising differences at the collective level between 
cooperative and for-profit firms (Bonin, Jones and Putterman, 1993). On the other hand, 
cooperatives are to be distinguished also from other non-profit organisations, since 
members’ wellbeing is their primary objective, while traditional non-profits are defined 
by wider societal aims, which stem at least partly from broader socially inclusive 
preferences (Sacchetti, 2012). Given their non-profit nature, external financiers have 
limited incentives to invest and to organise production in cooperatives, both because 
private returns on investment on specific assets are lower than in for-profit firms, and 
because - in terms of conventional economic approaches to property rights - cooperative 
control rights increase the risks of losses and of morally hazardous behaviours by the 
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self-organised principals. The weak interest of external investors to financing 
cooperatives - an interest that regards mainly loans or to the purchase of cooperative 
bonds   places the obligation to fulfil economic, financial, and organisational 
requirements directly on the self-organised membership. 
When cooperatives are able to withstand their financial needs, then behavioural 
differences become evident. Profit does not represent an objective in cooperatives as in 
conventional corporations. More specifically, the net residual in cooperatives is to be 
regarded as instrumental to the pursuit of other objectives that have to do with 
members’ wellbeing, not as an end in itself informed by the pursuit of shareholder value. 
At the most fundamental level economic returns and surpluses are used by cooperatives 
to guarantee the long-term survival and expansion of the organisation. The sustainability 
of activities is to be pursued in a way that guarantees the long-term desired level of 
members’ wellbeing both in material and non-material terms. Because of these reasons, 
cooperatives can be regarded as stable non-profit oriented firms that operate in the 
market. 
Differently, in new institutionalism, cooperatives (as most other typologies of non-
investor owned, non-profit oriented organizations, e.g. non-profits and social 
enterprises) are interpreted as transitional organizations (Hansmann, 1996). They are 
deemed as be useful and effective in certain specific circumstances, such as in emerging, 
non-competitive, and unregulated markets characterized by marked imperfections (in 
terms of market power and asymmetric information). However, as markets become 
more competitive and better regulated, new institutionalism suggests that cooperatives 
are bound to fade away and become marginal. Better performing and highly capitalized 
investor-owned, for-profit companies are predicted to take over as dominant 
organisations.  
The main reason, from a new institutionalist perspective, is that cooperatives are 
regarded as cost-inflating and, therefore, inefficient entrepreneurial organisations. 
Democratic governance is depicted as a cost-generating solution, while its socio-
economic potentials (in terms of innovation or of benefits for the members and the wider 
community) are not considered. By the same token, the value-laden nature of 
cooperative aims is downgraded when compared with the pure commercial rational of 
for-profit enterprises. New institutionalism presents therefore a limited understanding of 
cooperation, wherever it fails to encompass the specificities of membership rights as 
opposed to shareholding rights, the idea of mutuality and its implications for cooperative 
governance, or the wider implications for communities that democratic participation to 
economic activities can have. 
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3. The pragmatic nature of cooperatives 
Taking a broader stand than neo-institutionalism on the issue of democratic production 
governance, ICA’s members agreed on the Statement on the Co-operative Identity at 
the 1995 Manchester Congress. The statement identified the values of cooperation in 
“self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity, solidarity, justice, mutual 
help” as well as “social responsibility and caring for others” (ICA, 1995). The majority of 
these values are not, as a norm, emphasised across conventional business communities, 
but rather represent a niche culture defining the specificities cooperative movement.3  
The above values are implemented through seven cooperative principles, which 
emphasise: 1) voluntary and open membership; 2) democratic member control; 3) 
member economic participation; 4) autonomy and independence; 5) education, training 
and information; 6) cooperation among cooperatives; 7) concern for community (ICA, 
1995; Appendix 1). The community care principle in particular was the last one to be 
introduced at the ICA congress of 1995, to reflect the value of “social responsibility and 
caring for others” (ICA, 1995).  
Like for other cooperative values, the community welfare dispositions of cooperative 
behaviour emerged empirically, out of the identification of recognised common practices 
and concerns across cultures, industrial sectors and activities. Ian MacPherson, who led 
the process that eventually resulted in the definition of the ICA cooperative identity, 
notices how the principles represent benchmarks rather than stringent features of 
cooperatives. In particular, he observes how “democracy is always a work in progress … 
a dimension of membership that should always be evolving” (MacPherson, 2012, p. 11). 
In fact, despite the identification of the principles, assuming their absolute 
implementation would lead to an unrealistic appreciation of the variety of governance 
settings, processes, behaviours, outcomes and opportunities for improvement which can 
be observed and conceived across cooperative organisations.  
The common identity of cooperatives, therefore, may be better explained in behavioural 
terms rather than alongside new institutional economics, with its emphasis on the 
minimisation of governance costs (Hansmann, 1996). The points of contact between new 
institutionalism and the ICA’s pragmatic approach are only in some respects 
straightforward. For example, ICA requires cooperatives to be economically sustainable 
and independent, finding compatibility with the neo-institutional criterion of cost 
minimization. However, ICA also requires cooperatives to be democratically run by their 
members, and this aspect is in contrast with the alleged inefficiency of democratic 
governance which, for neo-institutionalism, inflates decision-making costs as well as the 
risk of internal contrasts, and the more so when the membership is characterized by 
heterogeneous preferences. It follows that the economic efficiency principle represents 
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only a portion of the outcomes against which the fulfilment of the ICA principles is 
evaluated, the others being related to the seven principles (Novkovic et al. 2012).  
The cooperative model faces many challenges in meeting its principles, not least 
because, as noticed, these are not typically emphasised or rewarded in the market place, 
where cooperatives operate. Evidence of the difficulties of implementing democratic 
governance, besides the criticism moved by new-institutionalism, are subsumed in 
particular by the three dimensions identified by Cormforth at al. (1988). These are:  a) 
“constitutional degeneration,” which occurs when decision-making power shifts from the 
members to a restricted group and turns into the exercise of power by an elite; b) 
“capitalist degeneration,” when cooperatives adopt financial instruments and practices 
that are typical of investor-controlled firms; c) “internal pressures” when misbehaviour 
and opportunism increase managerial control at the expenses of democratic and 
deliberative processes (Cf. Varman and Chakrabarti, 2004). Consistently with the first 
degenerative element, literature has emphasised the dangers associated with the 
emulation of practices and strategies of conventional businesses, possibly inducing 
membership apathy and mining the sustainability of the cooperative organisation 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Spear, 2004). In line with the latter point and with 
Hansmann’s transaction costs perspective, others have emphasised how internal 
governance failures can play against cooperatives’ survival, and represent a serious 
threat to the possibility of enhancing welfare through self-management. Cases of fraud, 
in worst case scenarios, jeopardise trust between members and management, as well as 
the firm’s reputation within the community (Hernandez, 2006; Cornforth, 2004; Spear, 
2004; Birchall, 2002).4i In some of these contributions democratic governance is seen as 
weaker and more vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour than hierarchical governance.    
The conclusion that can be drawn from this body of literature is that an equation 
between aims and principles on the one hand, and individual cooperative practices on 
the other, may not, in some cases, support the explanation of cooperative performance 
with respect to member and community welfare. There can be misalignment between 
principles and practices towards external stakeholders (community), or inside the 
cooperative. It follows that opportunities for improving performance with respect to the 
ICA guidelines can emerge through a critical appreciation of strategies, practices, and 
principles. Therefore, an understanding of outcomes and opportunities requires, in line 
with the pragmatic approach that qualifies ICA, a focus on strategic choices and 
outcomes as much as on underpinning values and principles. 
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4. The governance of production linkages 
Although cooperatives aim at being independent from other investor influences, we 
would suggest that in practice the representative function of cooperatives may be, to 
different degrees, casted also from the outside and, in particular, by the nature of inter-
firm relationships. Similarly to what has been argued about traditional for-profit firms, 
cooperatives do not work in isolation. Extending Coase’s warning, neither conventional 
firms, nor cooperatives can be considered as “islands of economic planning” (Coase, 
1937). Cooperatives are businesses which operate in the market, interacting with its 
extent, structure and technologies, whilst being placed in a context often dominated by 
investor-owned firms, their for-profit nature and related incentives (Varman and 
Chakrabarti, 2004).5  The need for linkages was earlier justified by Richardson (1972) in 
terms of complementarities of competences and assets that firms seek. More broadly, 
the position that the firm occupies in production networks, the characteristics of 
interaction and complementarities, have been argued to impact on firm performance 
(Jarillo, 1988, Gagliardi, 2010) as well as on governance, in terms of who determines 
strategic direction and how problems are addressed within the network (Helper, 1990; 
Markusen, 1996; Sacchetti and Sugden, 2003; Sako, 2004;Thorelli 1986).  
Given the peculiarities of aims and principles of cooperatives, at a more fundamental 
level interconnectedness requires the difficult task of balancing the values applied 
internally to the pursuit of members’ welfare with the values underpinning relations with 
other organisations, whether cooperatives or investor-owned companies. This aspect 
reinforces the need to specify the nature of coordination in terms of location of strategic 
decision-making power, rather than in terms of business functions, e.g. marketing, 
production, R&D, finance (Sacchetti and Sugden, 2003). 
To make sense of the nature of linkages in terms of their welfare outcomes, we build on 
Cowling and Sugden (1998) and allow for strategic choice power to be located outside 
the cooperative, and consider, in particular, external influences stemming out of 
cooperatives as well as those affecting cooperatives (or other forms of businesses). For 
each of its linkages, then, a cooperative firm can be considered as: 
(a) An inter-actor, or an active participant which relates with another firm on a mutual 
and reciprocal basis;  
(b) The recipient of another organisation’s strategic choices, or an organisation which is 
mostly subject to decisions taken elsewhere; 
(c) A director, that is an active participant which represents an external source of 
direction for another firm. 
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The first stylised relational form, mutual inter-action, is the one that best fit with 
cooperative ideals, as it emphasises heterarchical relations based on deliberation, 
reciprocity, and mutual dependence (Sacchetti and Sugden, 2009). Differently, in the 
second and third typologies the recipient firm and the director firm assume, in turn, a 
passive and an active role. The active role of the director carries the potential of being 
exerted at the expenses of the recipient, who is not included in the making of strategic 
decisions on which it has an interest. When the director is a cooperative firm, the 
exclusion of a relevant stakeholder is not in line with the general principle of cooperation 
among cooperatives. When the recipient firm is a cooperative, the passive role is not 
consistent with the principle of autonomy and independence. The exclusion from relevant 
production decisions depicted by the director-recipient relation detaches some of the 
cooperative principles from actual strategic behaviour, both for the director and for the 
recipient. 
 
5. Internal and external cooperative institutions 
There is a complex puzzle emerging from the joint consideration of internal and external 
governance. To clarify, we now build on Williamson’s analysis of institutional layers to 
provide an interpretative scheme of cooperative firms’ practices. Table 1 systematises 
different levels where values represent the foundational layer shaping all subsequent 
institutional formalisations (Williamson, 2000). The foundational layer is the realm of 
evolving values, shaped by individual experience as they strive for the fulfilment of their 
needs and desires (Level 1). The cooperative values, as other values, are part of this 
process. Principles, such as the 7 ICA principles, reside at a subsequent level. They are 
the instruments that can objectify such values. Furthermore, legislation can support the 
actualisation of cooperative values by defining the nature of property rights. In 
particular, the designation of who owns and control resources, respond to principles of 
voluntary and open membership, joint ownership of members, and members’ economic 
participation. The general aim is to increase members’ welfare through self-help, self-
responsibility, and mutuality (Level 2).  
Table 1 about here 
Values are reflected also in principles that define how control over the use of resources 
has to be implemented. Within the cooperative model, the principles of democratic 
member control and participation in the allocation of surplus define the internal 
governance structure (Level 3). The purpose of these instruments, specifically, is to 
achieve procedural fairness, as per the values of equality and equity (Tyler and Blader, 
2000; Borzaga and Tortia, 2006). 
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Further to this, the rules underpinning the actual allocation of resources are defined by 
an internal incentive system which emphasises limited remuneration of capital as well as 
the reinvestment of surplus for mutualistic and communitarian purposes (Level 4). These 
instruments are particularly oriented towards the pursuit of distributive fairness, long-
term sustainability and the creation of societal value. 
Having defined the association between values and the principles which characterise 
cooperative internal institutions, the next step is to define a correspondent set of 
external institutional levels. Given the initial set of values forming the cooperative 
business culture, the definition of formal institutions that regulate external linkages may 
be coherently reflected in the definition of second level cooperatives, for example 
consortia or cooperative groups, which take the form of cooperatives of cooperatives 
(Level 2). This form of collaboration would be consistent with the set of cooperative 
values as well as with the internal principle of joint member ownership at Level 2 and 
democratic member control at Level 3. Likewise other contracts (e.g. financial 
participation, partnerships, subcontracting) should be drafted so that the governance of 
the collaboration is heterarchical, participatory and democratic. At Level 4 the allocation 
of surplus should follow similar rules to those of first level cooperatives. In the case of 
second level cooperatives distribution of material and immaterial surplus is effected 
through participatory and non-exclusive mechanisms, which take into account the 
objectives and the needs of all involved constituencies. Likewise, incentives should be 
drafted to achieve mutual benefit with no parties exploiting their competitive advantages 
against others’ interests. 
 
6. Hub-led types of coordination  
The application of the institutional layers scheme to cooperatives can clarify the actual 
behaviour of the cooperative towards each and every firm or cluster of firms in its 
production network. We bring together financial participation and other contractual 
agreements and consider the consequences of inter-firm coordination in terms of 
consistency of values and behavioural predisposition to cooperate. We will also account 
for collective governance arrangements for the coordination of common activities 
(mutual-help networks and consortia). The underpinning idea is that financial 
participation and other contractual agreements represent different but converging 
modalities for achieving coordination in the formation of an extended network (Amin and 
Cohendet, 2000; Grandori, 2000; Nootemboon, 2000). In particular, financial 
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participation has to do with the exchange of ownership rights, while coordination by 
means of contracts represents a mechanism based on the governance of relations.  
First consider coordination by means of financial integration. The tightening of 
coordination typically occurs through strategies that involve financial integration and, in 
the case of the largest cooperatives, the creation of groups where the core cooperative 
holds financial control in a number of other conventional firms (e.g. joint stock 
companies or limited by shares) thus internalising relations and activities.6 For example, 
in construction or manufacturing (because of the technology, fixed costs and scale of 
activities) worker cooperatives tend to integrate conventional businesses through 
shareholding (an example is Coopsette in Italy).7 The activities of controlled companies 
are in general functional to the activity of the leader firm, although they may not be 
directly related to it. Such strategy can support in particular capital accumulation, 
allowing cooperatives to raise capital through traditional for-profit companies (Cf. 
Menzani and Zamagni (2010) for a historical account of network features in the Italian 
context).  
Secondly, consider coordination through contractual agreements, with the principal aim 
of increasing flexibility. In this case the core operates by means of subcontracting 
agreements, ventures and other collaborative forms such as consortia and network 
contracts. Consortia and network contracts are formal institutional tools that indicate 
how inter-firm cooperation treats common capital reserves and resource allocation 
across the cooperating organisations, and provide guidance on the governance and 
incentives operating across the network. In constructions for example the core may 
resort to temporary consortia for the delivery of specific projects, generally holding a 
substantive quota in each consortium. Cooperatives (as well as other firm types) can 
also create networks that hold legal responsibility through a ‘network contract’, as for 
example in Italy since 2009.8  
Having anticipated that production relations may entail cooperation amongst inter-
actors, but also more hierarchical ties between a director and a recipient, we use the 
multi-layered institutional scheme depicted in Table 1 to identify commonalities and 
diversities amongst the variety of inter-firm linkages described above, and their potential 
welfare effects. In particular, we set exclusive hub-led coordination and cooperative hub-
led coordination as two rather extreme ideal-typical settings, against which to contrast 
the reality of coordination orchestrated by cooperatives. The first typology is based on 
the director-recipient relationship, whilst the second features inter-actors. For each type 
we focus on elements mediated from Table 1, specifically: 
(a) Formal institutions: the positioning of each firm in the relation through property 
rights and contracts; 
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(b) Governance structure and strategic control: the distribution of control over 
production resources across firms; 
(c) Contracts: constraints and incentives towards the achievement of relation-specific 
aims; 
(d) Values in practice: the values infused in the practices of the cooperative when 
relating to other organisations or stakeholders. 
Table 2 about here 
6.1 Exclusive hub-led coordination 
We talk of exclusive hub-led coordination, when internal governance reflects, to some 
extent, the democratic principle on the one hand, whilst at the same time confining its 
underpinning values within the cooperative organisational borders. Relations with 
subsidiaries (through financial integration), complex governance (consortia and other 
mutual-help networks), and contract-based relationships (such as ventures or 
subcontracting arrangements), would be functional to the objectives of the core 
cooperative or particular groups within it, even despite the welfare of subsidiaries, 
partner companies or subcontractors. In line with the strategic governance approach 
(Cowling and Sugden, 1998), we suggest that when the hub cooperative uses its power 
advantage to take strategic decisions despite the desires of the ‘recipients’, consistency 
between mutualistic principles of cooperatives and the wider principles of cooperation is 
undermined.  
 
As an illustration, consider a hub cooperative acting as the ‘director’ of the supply chain, 
the cooperative may manage relations in different ways. In fact, the greater the distance 
from the perfectly competitive market benchmark, the higher the relevance of firm 
behaviour and, therefore, of the choice of the governance and incentive structure 
through which coordination is implemented. It follows that, depending on the market 
structure and type of competition, and despite its non-for profit nature, the cooperative 
could, as a possibility, seek monopoly power or collusive agreements with other 
producers, or exert its market power against suppliers.9 Where the competitive element 
is more incisive, strategy may focus further on permanent cost minimisation by 
stimulating arm’s length market competition among substitutable producers, typically for 
low knowledge content production types.  In summary, we talk about exclusive hub-led 
coordination when the modalities of the interaction resemble governance by exclusive 
direction, where relationships are administered strategically without coordination 
mechanisms that guarantee that the interests of other firms are properly taken into 
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account (Sacchetti and Sugden, 2003). In other words, this is a case of coordination 
without cooperation. 
 
6.2 Cooperative hub-led coordination 
Conversely, we call cooperative hub-led coordination a production relation where the 
core organisation applies its core principles also to external governance, actively 
searching for mutually beneficial opportunities, for compatibility between the objectives 
of members and the interests of other stakeholders. The application of the cooperative 
principles to other firms would add consistency to the organisation also internally, 
although this may increase the tensions between those who perceive the cooperative as 
being essentially about the welfare of members and those who would regard behaviour 
towards others outside the cooperative as subject to similar principles. When the 
cooperative coordinates its different sets of relations on the ground of cooperative 
principles more generally, external coordination would endorse (through appropriate 
mixes of financial participation, contractual arrangements, networking and other 
substantive practices) participatory governance processes and mutually beneficial 
incentive structures   (Sacchetti and Sugden, 2009). 
 
6.3 The evolving nature of coordination and its institutions: The Mondragon Group 
In practice, cooperatives and those of large size in particular coordinate with other firms 
through a variety of mechanisms, and can resort to both exclusive hub-led or 
cooperative hub-led coordination. To illustrate, consider the expansion and 
internationalisation of the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation, the Basque cooperative 
group which since its foundation after WWII has, in many respects, pioneered the 
articulation of a system of inter-organisational rules alongside the principles of 
cooperation. In 2011 the group associated 258 organisations, including 109 
cooperatives, 125 subsidiary companies and employing over 83,500 (Mondragon, 2011). 
Despite its shared values, internal and international growth has not occurred without 
tensions. In particular, the expansion of retailing in Spain (the Eroski retail chain 
employs 45,000) and manufacturing overseas involving 65 production plants and 14.601 
employees in 2006 (Monasterio et al. 2009) has been shaped by a strategy of 
acquisitions and green-field investments for the creation of subsidiaries, without worker 
membership. In 2011, 82 per cent of the workforce employed in manufacturing activities 
was constituted by members. However within the retailing sector of the group 
membership was only 26.5 per cent,10 the others being non-members or temporary 
workers in seasonal activities (Altuna, 2008). At the same time, overseas the Mondragon 
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group has been argued having adopted a strategy towards internationalisation similar, in 
some respects, to those of traditional transnational corporations (Errasti et a. 2003).  
FDIs have reflected, in part, a strategy of cost minimisation, but also risk reduction in 
the face of diverse workers attitudes regarding employee ownership across countries, 
and different legal and juridical frameworks.11 Overall, the growth strategy of Mondragon 
has raised an issue around their actual values, where the pursuit of members’ welfare 
becomes a cost for other workers inside controlled or otherwise affiliated companies. 
Tensions between membership and management on such matters may run the risk of 
damaging, in particular, the trustworthiness of the cooperative as well as member 
motivations.  
The challenges to the idea of membership presented by growth across sectors and 
regions, through internationalisation, are currently unresolved, but likely to change again 
the architecture of rules at Mondragon. In the attempt to improve the application of the 
principles of cooperation, in 2009 the retail chain Eroski has developed a plan to enhance 
participation by including workers in employee ownership schemes (Sánchez and 
Roelants, 2011; Jones and Kalmi, 2012). Overall there are also plans across the group to 
re-discuss and find mechanisms to support the extension of membership rights to 
workers overseas, gradually starting a process aimed at reducing control and direction 
beyond membership rights.12 This is likely to be a complex process riddled with tensions. 
The governance of relations and, likewise, its impact on distributional outcomes across 
borders and institutional set-ups will require a careful balancing between the extension 
of empowering rules (e.g. unrestrained extension of membership rights) on the one hand 
and, on the other, the segmentation of the membership on the basis of contextual 
conditions (e.g. different wage levels based on parity of purchasing power). More 
generally, the historical evolution of the largest existing cooperative group suggests that 
the development of both internal and external democratic governance requires complex 
operations of social reconstruction that often take place in the institutional void, as far as 
cooperation is concerned. This aspect of cooperative development reinforces the need for 
a constant appraisal and elaboration of strategies, practices and values in a pragmatist 
fashion (Morrison, 1991; Stikkers, 2011). 
 
7. Mutual-help networks of small and medium co-operatives (SMCs) as an 
answer to market power 
When interacting with suppliers or buyers, the cooperative, which is often created to 
overcome the presence of monopoly and monopsony power in upstream and 
downstream sectors (Hansmann, 1996, Borzaga and Tortia, 2010), can undergo 
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exploitative contractual relations by the private contractors. Small and medium size 
cooperatives (SMCs), on the other hand, are likely to be subject to dependence on their 
main contractors, whether those are conventional firms, larger cooperatives or public 
administrations. Consider for example the provision of social services, where 
cooperatives currently play a large role.13 Typically the public sector would work as the 
main contractor of local social cooperatives. In this case cooperative objectives are 
mostly influenced by the welfare policy and standards set by policy makers.  
Our framework suggests that a strong dependence of SMCs on an exclusive hub-led 
relation runs the risk of hollowing out the bond between management and members, 
whilst exacerbating the potential tension between member welfare and economic 
sustainability. Also in the case of state-anchored cooperatives, where the type of 
direction provided by the public sector may be expected to have a number of contact 
points with cooperative principles, consistency (and in particular the principle of 
cooperative autonomy and independence) need to be tested in practice, as dependence 
on the public sector is in general high and can expose the cooperative to the dangers of 
public failure. Consider, for example, inefficiencies in public administrations causing 
delays that make social cooperatives insolvent, eventually bankrupt, and service 
beneficiaries uncovered. Consider also the tendency of the public sector to prefer the 
delivery of low quality, but standardized and easily controllable set of services, to the 
experimentation of innovative, but more effective and creative solutions.  
Again, where the decision-making power of the membership is subordinated to the 
strategies of third parties, the principles of the cooperative may be at risk, and likewise 
member rights. Also growth strategies aimed at developing monopolistic power as an 
answer to monopolistic power would not be aligned to the value principles of 
cooperation, which rely on free and independent entrepreneurial action.  
Rather, beyond relaying on regulation of exchanges, cooperatives could resort to 
mutual-help networking, such as consortia, as an instrument to achieve sufficient 
dimension and ability to contrast the monopoly power of a supplier or the monopsony 
power of the public sector or other private firms. These strategies may be absent or 
ineffective when the cooperative acts in isolation, or when it is confined to exclusive 
relations with the contractor. The recognition of the potential of peer networking to free 
small cooperatives from unfair constraints relies on both the cooperative ability to build 
effective relations and on the willingness of the public regulator to properly recognize in 
consortia and networks valid development tools for SMCs.  
These types of coordination are grounded on peer-support and control, gathering groups 
of cooperatives that rely on socially-embedded governance mechanisms, such as shared 
values, trust and reciprocity. The mechanisms have also been considered as the basis for 
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local social capital formation (Sabatini et al., 2012) as they can lower the risk of 
opportunism within communities (Galassi, 2001). Relationships typically involve a 
plurality of inter-actors with diverse and evolving interests and do not allow for direct 
control over production activities, which are instead prominent in ownership and, to 
some extent, contract-based relations. Consortia and similar forms of networking can be 
interpreted as mutual-help networks, aimed at creating specific group identities and give 
voice to co-operators and their stakeholders. They are typically backed by network 
statutes, aims and values declarations, as well as discussion fora. Through mutual-help 
networks, cooperatives pair the creation of business opportunities with awareness of 
their values; they generate capacity building and scale economies. Examples of this type 
of network are, in Italy, CGM (Consorzio Gino Mattarelli), with 5,800 associate 
cooperatives with social aims14, or those in Scotland introduced to support the 
development of social enterprises, such as Senscot (established in 1999), Social 
Enterprise Networks (both thematic and geographical), Development Trusts Association 
Scotland, Scotland Unltd (established between 2002 and 2003). 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
We have started this contribution by considering cooperative firms as entrepreneurial 
associations driven by self-organised action in which members are granted democratic 
and non-saleable control rights. We have also set the principles and objectives of 
cooperation as the benchmark for assessing inter-firm relations, as well as the impacts 
of coordination strategies on the welfare of linked firms.  
Consistently, our question regarded the extent to which the nature of inter-firm 
coordination mechanisms could be deemed consistent with the nature of cooperation and 
its principles.  
We have argued that unbalanced forms of control and direction, whether coming from 
outside the cooperative or effected by the cooperative itself, may emerge out of 
production relationships, in particular when the cooperative principles are not extended 
to the governance of inter-firm relations. Control achieved by the cooperative over linked 
companies may increase standard measures of economic performance in the core 
cooperative, at the potential price of eroding the welfare of stakeholders and demotivate 
members. For the recipient firms that are subject to external control, self-management 
is at risk of being hollowed out, leading to a decrease in the welfare of effected 
stakeholders, such as workers, producers, or users. On the other hand control power by 
external actors (a hub company or the public sector) is likely to depress and frustrate 
attempts to achieve democratic control and participation. These imbalances may be 
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reflected, for example, by a lower degree of members’ satisfaction and welfare. Also, 
unequal decision-making power could back-up on the relations between the cooperative 
and its membership, for example exacerbating detachment between managers’ and 
members’ objectives. 
The suggested answer to our question would be that with power unbalances amongst 
organisations, the consistency between organisational strategies and the principles of 
cooperation can be placed at risk and generate tensions across members and other 
stakeholders. To counteract these degenerative tendencies, inter-firm relations could 
prompt an extended notion of mutuality, as in acknowledging, through appropriate 
processes, multiple perspectives and interests in order to achieve solutions that do not 
compromise each other’s fundamental values and needs. Inter-firm mutualistic 
coordination can be achieved through appropriate institutional arrangements involving, 
in different measures, the allocation of property rights, strategic choice power and 
incentives, all of which should be monitored against the principles of cooperation. 
Cooperative hub-led coordination and mutual-help networks can institutionalise peer-
support and control, and democratic governance by means of formal or customary rules. 
Complementary, practices that acknowledge and support the use of improved means of 
communication and deliberation should be encouraged, not least to achieve an inter-
subjective understanding, amongst members and organisations, of the meaning and 
value of cooperation, as well as of consistent practices. 
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Notes 
1 Also, a body of theoretical and empirical studies has accentuated cases of external constraints, as 
related to ill-suited legal frameworks, access to capital, production conditions and contractual 
requirements, bargaining and decision-making costs, or external controls of political nature (Russell, 
1991; Ben-Ner, 1993; Book and Ilmonen 1989; Lima, 2007; Hernandez, 2006; Speckbacher, 2008; 
Wanyama et al. 2009; Birchall and Simmons, 2010). 
2 Such understanding is inter-subjective and context dependent. We can expect therefore different 
interpretations and implementations across localities and organisations, more or less in line with the 
seven ICA cooperative principles. A more general stakeholder perspective would allow a tailored 
application of our framework and further specifications regarding the nature of coordination and 
value consistency. For example, within producer cooperatives issues of worker welfare may be 
disregarded by a more standard focus on member welfare. An interesting sector, in these respects, is 
agro-food. If observing producer cooperatives we would need to consider also employees as a major 
stakeholder (besides linked firms). 
3 We use niche-culture rather than the more widespread term of sub-culture because the latter 
creates a hierarchy amongst values which fails to recognise equal dignity to different expressions of 
values. 
4 Overall, however, some authors have found that free-riding carries less weight in cooperatives than 
in other organisational forms (Craig and Pencavel, 1992, 1994; Bartlett et al., 1992). 
5 Besides links for trading and production purposes, cooperation typically regards finance (typically 
through solidarity funds), the creation of scale and scope economies on a variety of business 
functions, capacity building, education and training (Roelants et al. 2012). 
6 Workers cooperatives, for example, are required not to fall below a given member-employee ratio 
which can be discretionally set by the cooperative, consistently with legal prescriptions (the latter, in 
some countries like Italy, may include a “prevailing mutuality” principle, which is a necessary 
condition to obtain also some fiscal advantages). 
7 Although cooperatives are not controlled by investors, in some cooperative models (e.g. in the 
Italian system) cooperatives can issue shares. The modalities of shareholding have to be defined and 
approved by the members. The Italian law allow shareholders up to one third of the total votes in 
the assembly. Investors cannot choose more than one third of the board of directors. 
8 The ‘network contract’ has been introduced as part of the policy measures towards the economic 
downturn in 2009. An interesting example of its application by cooperatives is the Conesco 
cooperation network, a permanent collaborative network amongst energy service companies that 
develop renewable energy in Southern Italy. Cf. Roelants et al. (2012). 
9 Similarly, in the case of consumer cooperatives such behaviour would contrast with the economic 
aim of maximizing member welfare, which is typically created to prevent price increases and quality 
reduction associated with monopoly power. 
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10 Own elaboration based on corporate data retrieved at http://www.cecop.coop/Eroski-integrates-
morethan-4-000 (accessed 23 October 2012). 
11 From the corporate website: “All our companies abroad are organised as Limited Companies. 
There are several reasons for this: most of the countries do not have the appropriate legislation of a 
cooperative nature that we have here; in many cases we incorporate these companies as a joint-
venture with other partners and, thirdly, and this is perhaps the main reason, the setting-up of 
cooperatives requires cooperative members who are used to working within a cooperative culture, 
and this is a process that takes time.” http://www.mondragon-corporation.com/language/en-
US/ENG/Frequently-askedquestions/Business-Strategy.aspx (accessed 23 October 2012). 
12 From the corporate website: “At our Congress held in May 2003, the decision was taken to drive 
the creation of formulas that allow for the participation in ownership and management by employed 
workers that pursue their activities in our non-cooperative companies.” 
http://www.mondragoncorporation.com/language/en-US/ENG/Frequently-asked-
questions/Business-Strategy.aspx (accessed 23October 2012). 
13 From the corporate website: “At our Congress held in May 2003, the decision was taken to drive 
the creation of formulas that allow for the participation in ownership and management by employed 
workers that pursue their activities in our non-cooperative companies.” 
http://www.mondragoncorporation.com/language/en-US/ENG/Frequently-asked-
questions/Business-Strategy.aspx (accessed 23October 2012). 
14 In 2005 the production costs of Italian social cooperatives nationally were 2.4 per cent below the 
level of total turnover and 63.2% of social cooperatives made a surplus (ISTAT, 2008). 
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Appendix 1 
“Cooperative identity, values and principles”  
(from the ICA website) 
 
Definition 
A co-operative is an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their 
common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned 
and democratically-controlled enterprise. 
 
Values 
Co-operatives are based on the values of self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, 
equality, equity and solidarity. In the tradition of their founders, co-operative members 
believe in the ethical values of honesty, openness, social responsibility and caring for 
others. 
 
Principles 
The co-operative principles are guidelines by which co-operatives put their values into 
practice. 
 
1. Voluntary and Open Membership 
Co-operatives are voluntary organisations, open to all persons able to use their services 
and willing to accept the responsibilities of membership, without gender, social, racial, 
political or religious discrimination. 
 
2. Democratic Member Control 
Co-operatives are democratic organisations controlled by their members, who actively 
participate in setting their policies and making decisions. Men and women serving as 
elected representatives are accountable to the membership. In primary co-operatives 
members have equal voting rights (one member, one vote) and co-operatives at other 
levels are also organised in a democratic manner. 
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3. Member Economic Participation 
Members contribute equitably to, and democratically control, the capital of their co-
operative. At least part of that capital is usually the common property of the co-
operative. Members usually receive limited compensation, if any, on capital subscribed 
as a condition of membership. Members allocate surpluses for any or all of the following 
purposes: developing their co-operative, possibly by setting up reserves, part of which at 
least would be indivisible; benefiting members in proportion to their transactions with 
the co-operative; and supporting other activities approved by the membership. 
 
4. Autonomy and Independence 
Co-operatives are autonomous, self-help organisations controlled by their members. If 
they enter into agreements with other organisations, including governments, or raise 
capital from external sources, they do so on terms that ensure democratic control by 
their members and maintain their co-operative autonomy. 
 
5. Education, Training and Information 
Co-operatives provide education and training for their members, elected representatives, 
managers, and employees so they can contribute effectively to the development of their 
co-operatives. They inform the general public - particularly young people and opinion 
leaders - about the nature and benefits of co-operation. 
 
6. Co-operation among Co-operatives 
Co-operatives serve their members most effectively and strengthen the co-operative 
movement by working together through local, national, regional and international 
structures. 
 
7. Concern for Community 
Co-operatives work for the sustainable development of their communities through 
policies approved by their members. 
 
Source: ICA Website http://ica.coop/en/what-co-op/co-operative-identity-values-
principles accessed October 2012. 
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Table 1 – Institutional levels 
 
 
I. 
INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS 
Individual values and believes, culture 
on the organisation of economic 
activities 
II. 
FORMAL INSTITUTIONS 
Property rights: who controls and 
appropriates resources 
III. 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
How control is implemented 
IV. 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
Incentive structure 
Self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, 
equality, equity, solidarity, justice, mutual 
help, social responsibility and caring for 
others  
Voluntary and open membership 
Ownership of members 
Democratic member control. 
Participation in  the finance and in the 
allocation of surplus. 
Autonomy . 
Limited remuneration of capital 
Reinvestment for mutualistic and 
communitarian purposes 
Fulfilment of needs  
To increase members’ welfare 
Procedural fairness 
Distributive fairness 
Long term sustainability 
Creation of societal value 
LEVEL COOPVERATIVE NICHE CULTURE PURPOSE 
Cooperatives of cooperatives, consortia, 
cooperative groups, short and long-term 
collaboration contacts 
Contracts promote heterarchical 
relations 
Mutual benefit;  non-exploitative  
contractual conditions 
a) Values 
b) Principles 
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Table 2 – Inter-firm coordination involving cooperatives 
Coordination features Exclusive hub-led 
coordination 
Cooperative hub-led 
coordination 
Formal Institutions: 
property rights, contracts 
defining the nature of the 
relationship. 
- A core organization with contractual/financial linkages with 
other cooperatives or investor-controlled companies; 
- When the focus is on ownership rights by means of financial 
linkages, the coop owns a share of a conventional company 
and coordination is internalised within a group. 
- Groups can be formed also as ways to create scale 
economies on specific functions and coordinate activities 
across cooperatives. 
 
Governance Structure/ 
Strategic Control: 
power distribution, or who 
controls the broad direction 
of production activities. 
- The core organization consolidates aspects of control beyond 
internal membership through ownership (subsidiaries) or 
through contracts (e.g. ventures, subcontracting) and 
practices (e.g. problem solving). 
 
- Strategic decision-making 
power is concentrated in the 
core; 
- The core organization 
controls the strategic direction 
of linked firms.  
- Albeit subject to the 
overarching rules of the  
relationship (venture, contract 
or group) strategic decision-
making rests in each 
cooperative. 
 
Incentives: 
the rules underpinning 
resource allocation towards 
relation-specific aims. 
 
Incentives are set to 
maximise the core 
cooperative/group interests, 
even disregarding those of 
other cooperatives or 
conventional investor-owned 
firms (e.g. cost minimisation). 
 
Incentives are set taking into 
account the needs and aims 
of other connected firms, both 
cooperatives and conventional 
investor-owned companies. 
 
 
Degree of tension and 
problem solving: 
due to power distribution 
across firms, incentives, and 
attitude towards problem 
solving. 
 
- Tensions amongst firms are 
addressed through processes 
that emphasize authority and 
control.  
- Processes can be codified by 
means of property rights, 
within contracts, or promoted 
by practice when contracts 
are incomplete. 
 
- Tensions are part of the 
interaction amongst firms, 
and are addressed through 
deliberative processes that 
reinforce communication and 
enquiry rather than authority 
and control. 
- Deliberative processes are 
especially suitable in the face 
of incomplete contracts. 
 
Consistency of values: 
whether the normative 
principles of cooperation are 
reflected in inter-firm 
relationships. 
 
- Relationships are mostly 
functional to the objectives of 
the core. 
- The principles of cooperation 
(as expressed by internal 
cooperative governance) are 
applied within the core to 
some extent, but not with 
respect to other 
organizations. 
 
- Relationships are mutually 
beneficial to the core and 
other linked firms.  
- The principles of cooperation 
(as expressed by internal 
cooperative governance) are 
applied, to some extent, 
within the core, as well as 
externally, to inter-firm 
relationships. 
 
                                                          
 
